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EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: COVENANTS NOT TO
COMPETE IN MINNESOTA
Current trends in Minnesota demonstrate a liberalization in rewriting employment
contract restrictive covenants. This Note summarizes the prevailing theories, exam-
ines Minnesota caselaw, and identifis the problems associated with using the lib-
eral Massachusetts rule of iterpreting employment contract restrictive covenants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most frequently litigated provisions of an employment con-
tract is the covenant not to compete.I Under a covenant not to compete,
or restrictive covenant, 2 an employee agrees, usually before employment
1. For a general background on covenants not to compete, see generally Blake, Em-
ployee Agreements'Not to fompete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960); Richards, Drafting and En-
forcing Restrictive Covenants Not To Compete, 55 MARQ. L. REv. 241 (1972); Comment,
Agreements Not To Compete, 33 LA. L. REv. 94 (1972); Comment, Contracts.- Employee Cove-
nants Not to Compete, 17 WASHBURN L. J. 665 (1978); 29 ARK. L. REV. 406 (1975).
In Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17,
105 N.E.2d 685 (1952), a decision celebrated for its wit and analysis, see Blake, supra, at
666, Arthur Murray sought to enforce a covenant not to compete to prevent a dance
instructor from working for a competing dance studio. In considering the wealth of au-
thority on restrictive covenants, the court stated:
This is not one of those questions on which the legal researcher cannot find
enough to quench his thirst. To the contrary there is so much authority it
drowns him. It is a sea-vast and vacillating, overlapping and bewildering. One
can fish out of it any kind of strange support for anything, if he lives so long.
This deep and unsettled sea pertaining to an employee's convenant not to com-
pete with his employer after termination of employment is really Seven Seas; and
now that the court has sailed them, perhaps it should record those seas so that
the next weary traveler may be saved the terrifying time it takes just to find
them.
Arthur Murray, at 20-21, 105 N.E.2d at 687. The court then cited 82 law reviews and
periodicals, 21 annotations, 10 encyclopedias, and 10 treatises. Id at 20-21, 105 N.E.2d at
687-88.
2. These covenants are also called non-competition clauses. In this Note, all em-
1
et al.: Employment Contracts: Covenants Not to Compete in Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1983
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
commences, 3 that he will not work for a competitor or compete with the
employer after termination of employment.4 At common law, restrictive
covenants were held to be void as restraints of trade.5 Although an aver-
sion to these covenants still persists,6 Minnesota courts have never held
them void per se.
7
Rather than declaring covenants not to compete void as general re-
straints of trade, modern courts that enforce these covenants have cre-
ated a distinction between general and partial restraints.8 If a restraint
reasonably protects an employer's legitimate business interests, it may be
characterized as partial, and therefore enforceable. 9 Because every re-
ployee agreements not to compete will be referred to as restrictive covenants, even though
other types of restrictive covenants may be contained in the contract of employment.
3. When the agreement has been entered into after employment has begun, a de-
fense to its validity may be failure or lack of consideraton. See Freeman v. Duluth Clinic,
Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1983); National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d
736 (Minn. 1982); Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Minn.
1980).
4. See Blake, supra note 1, at 626.
5. See id at 629-46.
6. See Jim W. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Minn. 1980)
("Such covenants are looked upon with disfavor because their enforcement decreases com-
petition in the marketplace and restricts the covenantor's right to work and his ability to
earn a livelihood."). The historical aversion to covenants not to compete has been ex-
plained as a function of the social order. National Benefit Co. v. Union Hosp. Co., 45
Minn. 272, 47 N.W. 806 (1891). The National Benefit court stated that:
[T]he courts frowned with great severity upon every contract of this kind. The
reasons for this partly grew out of the English law of apprenticeship, by which, in
its original severity, no person could exercise any regular trade or handicraft
except after having served a long apprenticeship. Hence, if a.person was pre-
vented from pursuing his particular trade, he was practically deprived of all
means of earning a livelihood, and the state was deprived of his services. No
such reason now obtains in this country, where every citizen is at liberty to
change his occupation at will.
Id at 275, 47 N.W. at 807.
This rationale for enforcing restrictive covenants was merely dicta which has not been
followed. See Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 409, 180 N.W. 553, 554 (1920) ("Eq-
uity will not enjoin the breach of a negative covenant in a contract, unless it is made to
appear that irreparable injury has resulted, or will in all probability result, to complainant
from such breach."). The language in' National Benefit overlooks the fact that a change of
employment by the employee might necessitate moving to a different area of the country.
See Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 537, 134 N.W.2d 892, 900 (1965).
A multitude of policy questions must be balanced in determining whether a particular
restrictive covenant is enforcable. See infira note 12.
7. See Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 409, 180 N.W. 533, 554 (1920) (must
show "irreparable injury has resulted, or will in all probability result, to complainant from
such breach"). Some jurisdictions prohibit restrictive covenants by statute, see infa note
54, but limited protection may still be possible.
8. See Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 533, 134 N.W.2d 892, 898
(1965); National Benefit Co. v. Union Hosp. Co., 45 Minn. 272, 274, 47 N.W. 806, 807
(1891); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 516(0 (1932); see also Eutectic Welding Alloys
Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 18, 160 N.W.2d 566, 570 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Heflebower v. Sand, 71 F. Supp. 607, 611 (D. Minn. 1947) (applying
19831
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strictive covenant case is decided on its own particular facts,10 trial courts
may exercise wide discretion in interpreting and enforcing such cove-
nants" and have fashioned only general tests of validity. 12 Conse-
quently, it is not possible to draft a covenant that will be reasonable in
all situations. 13
The Minnesota Supreme Court has granted employers unusually
broad relief in two recent cases involving breaches of restrictive conve-
nants. 14 In Cherne Industrial, Inc. v. Grounds &.Associates, Inc., 15 the plaintiff
firm produced "Operations and Maintenance" manuals for sewage treat-
ment systems.16 The defendants entered into employment contracts with
the plaintiff that required the defendants not to disclose any confidential
Minnesota law); Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 18-19, 160 N.W.2d
566, 570 (1968); Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 533, 134 N.W.2d 892,
898 (1965); Standard Oil Co. v. Bertelsen, 186 Minn. 483, 487, 243 N.W. 701, 703 (1932);
Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 299, 199 N.W. 10, 11-12 (1924) ("Courts scrutinize
carefully all contracts limiting a man's natural right to follow any trade or profession
anywhere he pleases and in any lawful manner."); Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407,
412, 180 N.W. 553, 555 (1920).
10. See Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 535, 134 N.W.2d 892, 899
(1965); Standard Oil Co. v. Bertelsen, 186 Minn. 483, 484, 243 N.W. 701, 702 (1932);
Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 410, 180 N.W. 553, 554 (1920).
11. See Hedberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 924, 932-33 (8th Cir.
1965) (applying Minnesota law; trial court's decision rarely disturbed on appeal); Cherne
Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81, 91 (Minn. 1979); AMF Pinspotters, Inc.
v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., 260 Minn. 499, 504, 110 N.W.2d 348, 351 (1961).
12. The most common test is balancing the employer's interest in preventing unfair
competition against the employee's interest in working in his chosen profession. See Jim
W. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Minn. 1980).
In Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17,
105 N.E.2d 685 (1952), the court mentions 13 factors to be considered in any restrictive
covenant case:
[FJreedom of contract, freedom of trade, sanctity of contract, individual liberty,
protection of business, right to work, making of training available to employee,
earning a livelihood for one's self and family, utilization of one's skill and talent,
continued productivity, betterment of one's status, avoidance of one's becoming
a public charge, encouragement of competition and discouragement of
monopoly.
Id. at 28, 105 N.E.2d at 692 (citations omitted). Most of these factors are historical. See
generally Blake, supra note 1, at 629-46. Professor Blake presents an excellent analysis of
the early English cases involving restrictive covenants.
13. See generally Blake, supra note 1, at 646-86. In Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co.,
270 Minn. 525, 134 N.W.2d 892 (1965), the court stated:
It may be fairly said that the merits of a dispute arising from the provisions of a
restrictive clause in an employment contract cannot always be determined by an
examination of the contract itself. The validity of the contract in each case must
be determined on its own facts and a reasonable balance must be maintained
between the interests of the employer and the employee.
Id. at 535-36, 134 N.W.2d at 899-900.
14. See Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980);
Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979).
15. 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979).
16. See id at 85.
[Vol. 9
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information which they acquired while employees, nor take this informa-
tion with them upon termination of employment. 17 The agreement also
restricted the employees' right to compete with plaintiff for two years
after termination of employment.' 8 The defendants breached the cove-
nants, took confidential information, and started their own competing
business before the two-year period had expired.19 Before plaintiff could
obtain judicial relief for the breach, the two-year period expired. The
court extended the temporal limitation 20 for two years after judgment
was entered.2 ' Until Cherne, the expiration of the original temporal limi-
tation was considered to make the issue of whether an employer qualified
for injunctive relief moot.
22
In Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 23 an insurance agency em-
ployee agreed not to compete with his employer within a radius of fifty
miles of three named cities for five years after termination.24 Over a
period of years the employee gained expertise in the sale of probate and
court bonds. Gradually, the plaintiff employer phased himself out of this
area of the business and relied solely on the defendant for this part of the
agency's operation. When disputes arose between plaintiff and defend-
ant concerning their working relationship, defendant was relieved of his
duties. Apparently the defendant began competing with plaintiff. Plain-
tiff then filed an action to enforce the restrictive covenant.
25
Since the defendant did little work in one of the named cities, the
court held that it could strike out the offending geographic elements and
enforce the covenant to the extent that it was reasonable. 26 The Davies
decision represents another advantage to employers: no longer will re-
strictive covenants fail merely because the geographic limitation, as re-
cited in the contract, is unreasonable.
The Cherne and Davies cases illustrate a clear liberalization of the
court's attitude toward restrictive covenants which may significantly de-
crease an employee's ability to successfully challenge the validity of even
unreasonable restraints.2 7 This Note will examine the historical founda-
tions of the common law of restrictive covenants in Minnesota. It will
17. See id at 86.
18. Id
19. Id at 86-87.
20. For a discussion of temporal limitations, see tifra notes 113-26 and accompanying
text.
21. 278 N.W.2d at 93.
22. See Walker Employment Serv., Inc. v. Parkhurst, 300 Minn. 264, 267, 219 N.W.2d
437, 439 (1974); Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 17-18 n.6, 160
N.W.2d 566, 569 n.6 (1968).
23. 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980).
24. Id at 129.
25. See id. at 130.
26. See id at 131-32.
27. See infra notes 106-12 & 153-57 and accompanying text.
1983]
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol9/iss2/7
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
also discuss the elements and requirements for valid restrictive covenants
and remedies for their breach. Most importantly, it will discuss recent
Minnesota cases that may have a significant impact on the drafting and
enforcement of restrictive covenants in Minnesota.
II. THE EARLY MINNESOTA CASES
National Benefit Co. v. Union Hospital Co. 28 is the leading Minnesota case
to set forth the general requirements for a valid restrictive covenant. 29 In
National Benefit, both parties sold medical insurance.30 The parties
agreed that plaintiff would sell only to railroad employees in Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and northern Michigan for three years and that defendant
would pay plaintiff for the right to sell to all others in this area.3 ' Plain-
tiff brought an action to force payment when defendant refused to pay
under the contract. Although National Benefit involved a sale of a busi-
ness rather than an employment contract, 32 the decision is instructive in
assessing the validity of employment contracts containing restrictive
covenants.
Speaking for the court, Justice Mitchell noted that the primary tension
caused by restrictive covenants is between the freedom of contract and
the public policy against restraints of trade.3 3 Generally, freedom of con-
tract will not be interfered with if the restraint is reasonable. The re-
straint, however, only can "afford a fair protection to the party in whose
favor it is made." 34 The agreement cannot be designed to monopolize
the market by limiting production or distribution. In addition, there
must be a limitation on the geographical areas to which the covenant
applies.35 No limitation is considered reasonable if the business involved
has a public duty.36 In holding that the covenant was enforceable, the
National Benefit court noted that the covenant was limited in space and
time, and was not in general restraint of trade.3 7
Justice Mitchell dismissed the historical aversion to restrictive cove-
28. 45 Minn. 272, 47 N.W. 806 (1891).
29. See, e.g., Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 533-34 & n.2, 134
N.W.2d 892, 898 & n.2 (1965); Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 304, 199 N.W. 10, 13
(1924).
30. 45 Minn. at 273, 47 N.W. at 806.
31. See id. at 274, 47 N.W. at 806.
32. See, e.g., People's Cleaning & Dyeing Co., Inc. v. Share, 168 Minn. 474, 210 N.W.
397 (1926); Southworth v. Davison, 106 Minn. 119, 118 N.W. 363 (1908).
33. See 45 Minn. at 276, 47 N.W. at 807.
34. Id
35. Id This last requirement was dispensed with in Southworth v. Davison, 106
Minn. 119, 121, 118 N.W. 363, 363 (1908) ("limitation as to both time and place is unnec-
essary, if the agreement in other respects be reasonable, and not in conflict with public
policy or the general welfare"). Nonetheless, it is still generally considered a requirement.
See Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. 1977).
36. See 45 Minn. at 276-77, 47 N.W. at 807.
37. Id at 274-75, 47 N.W. at 807.
[Vol. 9
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nants, stating "every citizen is at liberty to change his occupation at will"
and therefore, no one is deprived of a livelihood.38 Fortunately for em-
ployees in Minnesota, this narrow reasoning has not been applied with
much vigor. Until recently, subsequent to National Benefit, 39 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court applied different tests of validity to restrictive cove-
nants involving a sale of a business and employment contract restrictive
covenants.
40
The leading Minnesota case on employment contract restrictive cove-
nants is Menter Co. v. Brock. 41 In Menter, plaintiff hired defendant to man-
age a clothing store in Minneapolis. Under the contract of employment,
defendant agreed not to compete with plaintiff in that city for four years
after his employment was terminated.42 Two years after commencing
employment, defendant resigned and opened his own clothing store sev-
eral blocks from plaintiffs store. The plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to
enjoin defendant from operating his business.
Refusing to enjoin defendant from competing, the supreme court dis-
tinguished covenants arising out of the sale of a business from employ-
ment contract restrictive covenants. 4 3 A plaintiffs burden for proving
38. Id at 275, 47 N.W. at 807.
39. See bifra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
40. For example, sale of business restrictive covenants have a strong presumption of
validity. See Holliston v. Ernston, 124 Minn. 49, 52, 144 N.W. 415, 416 (1913). The mere
breach of a sale of business restriction covenant points to a finding of irreparable injury.
See Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 409, 180 N.W 553, 554 (1920) (dictum); see also
infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
In Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co., 204 Minn. 300, 283 N.W. 561 (1939), which involved
a sale of business restrictive covenant, the court cites the Menter decision only for the prop-
osition that employment restrictive covenant cases are irrelevant in sale of business cases.
See id. at 305, 283 N.W. at 565. But see Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298
N.W.2d 127, 131 n.1 (Minn. 1980) ("The reasons for permitting modification" of geo-
graphic and temporal limitations in sale of business cases "are equally applicable to the
employment context."). In sale of business cases, the breach is the controlling factor, and
a finding of irreparable injury is not important. See Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. at
409,180 N.W. at 554 (1920). In Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81
(1979), however, the court cites Peterson for its decision on the compensatory damages
issue. Id at 95. Cherne also cites Naftalin v. John Wood Co., 263 Minn. 135, 147, 116
N.W.2d 91, 100 (1962), another sale of business case, for the rule that restrictive covenants
are to be strictly construed and enforced only to the extent they are reasonable. 278
N.W.2d at 88-89 n.2.
41. 147 Minn. 407, 180 N.W. 553 (1920).
42. Id. at 408, 180 N.W. at 554. As part of the employment contract, the employee
agreed to pay $3,000 to the employer as liquidated damages if the employee breached the
restrictive covenant. Id at 409, 180 N.W. at 554. The Menter court, however, did not
reach the issue of whether the liquidated damages provision was a penalty. See id
43. Id at 411, 180 N.W. at 555; see, e.g., National Benefit Co. v. Union Hosp. Co., 45
Minn. 272, 47 N.W. 806 (1891). Several courts take the position that there is a difference
between interests sought to be protected in the case of an employer and those of a pur-
chaser of a business. Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15 (1955). For instance, in Purchasing Assocs.
v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 196 N.E.2d 245, 246 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1963), in an action by a
1983]
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irreparable injury is not great in cases involving covenants arising out of
the sale of a business.4a The mere breach of the covenant establishes
irreparable harm,45 since under most circumstances, the parties to a sale
of a business have equal bargaining power and the purchase price of the
business includes payment for good will.46 Thus, "injunctions are freely
granted almost as a matter of course in such and analogous cases."
4 7
In employment contract restrictive covenants, irreparable injury is not
necessarily established by the fact that an employee breached his con-
tract by competing with his employer. Injury must be shown.48 In Men-
ter, the court found that the employment contract was one-sided; many
restrictions were placed on the employee and none on the employer.
49
For example, the employee agreed not to compete for four years after
termination and agreed to pay liquidated damages of $3,000 if he
breached the contract. The employer, on the other hand, did "not agree
to keep [the employee] in its employ for a single day."50 The court con-
cluded that an injunction should be granted only where the employee's
name carries with it the goodwill of the employer's business, or when
trade secrets have been obtained, the disclosure of which would lead to
corporation to restrain a former employee from violating a covenant against competition,
the court discussed the differences in the two kinds of covenants. Id at 272, 196 N.E.2d at
247-48, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 604. In a sale of business, courts will enforce an incidental cove-
nant by the seller not to compete with the buyer after the sale. The Weitz court found this
rule to be grounded "on the premise that a buyer of a business should be permitted to
restrict his seller's freedom of trade so as to prevent the latter from recapturing and utiliz-
ing, by his competition, the good will of the very business which he transferred for value."
Id at 271, 196 N.E.2d at 247, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
As pointed out by the Weitz court, a covenant given by an employee that he will not
compete with his employer does not involve the element of goodwill or its transfer. For
this reason and because there are considerations of public policy which "militate against
sanctioning the loss of a man's livelihood," the courts display a much stricter attitude to
covenants of this type. Id; see, e.g., Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 197 A.D. 66,
188 N.Y.S. 678 (1921), affd, 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485 (1923) ("In contradistinction to the
sale of a business an employee ordinarily receives no consideration other than the fact of
present employment; his labor is a full return for his wages."); Arthur Murray Dance
Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685 (1952) (there is
more freedom of contract between seller and buyer than between employer and em-
ployee); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 630-31, 136 A.2d 838,
845-46 (1957) ("general covenants not to compete which are ancillary to the sale of a
business serve a useful economic function. . . . Quite different reasons motivate the up-
holding of convenants not to compete which are ancillary to employment.").
44. See 147 Minn. at 411, 180 N.W. at 555; see also Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co., 204
Minn. 300, 305, 283 N.W. 561, 565 (1939).
45. See supra note 40.
46. See People's Cleaning & Dyeing Co. v. Share, 168 Minn. 474, 477-78, 210 N.W.
397, 398 (1926); Williams v. Thompson, 143 Minn. 454, 456, 174 N.W. 307, 308 (1919).
47. Holliston v. Ernston, 124 Minn. 49, 52, 144 N.W. 415, 416 (1913).
48. Menter, 147 Minn. at 410, 180 N.W. at 554.
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irreparable injury to the employer. Thus no injunction was granted. 5 1
The greater degree of proof required to show irreparable injury in em-
ployment contract restrictive covenant cases seems to be based upon a
fundamental difference between the two types of covenants. 52 Seldom
will anyone purchase an ongoing businss without an assurance that the
vendor will not compete after the sale. That the employer expects his
employee not to compete is not as apparent. Absent a valid restrictive
covenant, a terminated employee may compete with his ex-employer.53
51. Id at 413, 180 N.W. at 556.
52. It has been said that a different measure of "reasonableness" is used. Bennett v.
Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 534, 134 N.W.2d 892, 899 (1965);see also Original
Vincent & Joseph, Inc. v. Schiavene, 144 Del. Ch. 531, 134 A.2d 843 (1957) (courts of
equity are less prone to enforce restriction against competition in case of a mere employ-
ment contract than in a case where such restriction is part of a contract for sale of a
business); Insurance Center, Inc. v. Hamilton, 218 Ga. 597, 129 S.E.2d 801 (1963) (In
determining reasonableness of a restrictive covenant, greater latitude is allowed in those
covenants relating to the sale of a business than in those ancillary to employment).
Route salesmen traditionally are treated differently from other types of employees, in
terms of unfair competition. As stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Sanitary Farm
Dairies v. Wolf, 261 Minn. 166, 112 N.W.2d 42 (1961):
[Tihe authorities distinguish so-called "route" cases from other types of employ-
ment involving solicitations and sales. In actions of this kind the rights and obli-
gations of the employer and employee are to be determined on the basis of the
contribution each party has made to building the business and to enhancing the
goodwill of the patronage involved.
Id at 169, 112 N.W.2d at 45. See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 7 (1969).
53. See Jones v. Ernst & Ernst, 172 La. 406, 134 So. 375 (1931); see also Boone v.
Krieg, 156 Minn. 83, 194 N.W. 92 (1923). This assumption naturally flows from examin-
ing cases where the court has refused to enforce a restrictive covenant as in Menter Co. v.
Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 180 N.W. 553 (1920). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 516
comment h (1932 & Supp. 1979).
In Boone, defendant had been employed by plaintiff for eight years. After terminating
employment, defendant actively competed with plaintiff in the letter multigraphing busi-
ness. Since there was neither a restrictive covenant nor a question about trade secrets, the
court held that defendant could not be enjoined from competing even though the em-
ployer found the competition vexing. 156 Minn. at 84, 194 N.W. at 92. A different result
might occur where the employee solicits customers on established business routes of his
former employer.
Where trade secrets are involved, however, the employee might have a common law
duty not to disclose confidential information. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & As-
socs., 278 N.W.2d 81, 92 (Minn. 1979).
Section 396 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958) has been cited by
several courts for the protection of trade secrets in the absence of a valid restrictive cove-
nant. See Eastern Marble Prod. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 372 Mass. 835, 842, 364
N.E.2d 799, 803 (1977); Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Turner, 30 N.C. App. 686, 228
S.E.2d 478 (1976) (although employment contract was void under a California statute,
injunction to prevent disclosure affirmed).
Section 396 reads:
Using Confidential Information After Termination of Agency.
Unless otherwise agreed, after the termination of the Agency, the agent:
(a) has no duty not to compete with the principal;
(b) has a duty to the principal not to use or disclose to third persons, on his
1983]
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Indeed, some jurisdictions have prohibited employment contract restric-
tive covenants by statute.
54
Nevertheless, where the character of the employee's services are such
that the employee carries or develops goodwill for the employer, such as
in the case of a route salesman, a restrictive covenant may be essential if
the employer desires to be protected from competition after the employee
is terminated. Without such an agreement, the employee may be free to
solicit the employer's customers.
55
The covenant in Menter purported to be in consideration of the em-
ployment opportunity, the knowledge defendant gained about plaintiff's
method of doing business, and trade secrets defendant would acquire.
56
The court found the consideration inadequate and the information
gained by the employee to be so common and so well known in the in-
dustry that no protection was available. No irreparable injury was
proved, therefore, 57 and dismissal of the action by the lower court was
affirmed. 58 The Menter decision made it clear that the court is hesitant to
enforce restrictive covenants that represent an overreaching by employ-
account or on account of others, in competition with the principal or to his in-
jury, trade secrets, written lists of names, or other similar confidential matters
given to him only for the principal's use or acquired by the agent in violation of
duty. The agent is entitled to use general information concerning the method of
business of the principal and the names of customers retained in his memory, if
not acquired in violation of his duty as agent;
(c) has a duty to account for profits made by the sale or use of trade secrets and
other confidential information, whether or not in competition with the principal;
(d) has a duty to the principal not to take advantage of a still subsisting confi-
dential relation created during the prior agency relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958).
Where the employee schemes to divert the employer's business after termination by
copying down confidential customer lists, the employer may be entitled to injunctive re-
lief, absent a written or oral restrictive covenant. See Equipment Advertiser, Inc. v. Har-
ris, 271 Minn. 451, 459, 136 N.W.2d 302, 307 (1965).
54. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964 & Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 28-2-703 to -705 (1979 & Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1959). Other
jurisdictions merely regulate restrictive covenants, or restraints on trade, by statute. See
ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (1975 & Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1983); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23.921 (West 1964 & Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.761 (West 1967
& Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 to -4 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 53-9-8
to -11 (1979) (void if geographic limitation exceeds 25-mile radius); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 103.465 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981) (only permitted if necessary for protection of em-
ployer or principal).
55. See Sanitary Farm Dairies, Inc. v. Wolf, 261 Minn. 166, 172, 112 N.W.2d 42, 46
(1961). Even without a restrictive covenant, an injunction may reach a rival company
which induces an employee to leave his present employer, and take valuable trade secrets
with him. See Elaterite Paint & Mfg. Co. v. S.E. Frost Co., 105 Minn. 239, 117 N.W. 388
(1908).
56. 147 Minn. 407, 408, 180 N.W. 553, 554 (1920).
57. Id. at 410, 180 N.W. at 554. In Mnter, business actually increased after defendant
terminated. Id at 409, 180 N.W. at 554.
58. Id at 413, 180 N.W. at 556.
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ers. The court stated that "such a covenant finds its way into an employ-
ment contract not so much to protect the business as to needlessly fetter
the employee, and prevent him from seeking to better his condition by
securing employment with competing concerns." 59
In several other early cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
the character of the employee's services was a determining factor in ana-
lyzing the reasonableness of the restriction. 60 In Granger v. Craven, 61 a
doctor with an established medical practice in Rochester hired defend-
ant, another doctor, to treat patients with ear, nose, or throat problems.
The written employment contract stipulated that defendant agreed not
to engage in the practice of medicine or surgery within twenty miles of
the Rochester, Minnesota, for three years after termination. Several days
after serving notice of termination, defendant opened an office in Roch-
ester and began competing.62 Affirming the issuance of an injunction
restraining the defendant from competing, the supreme court distin-
guished Granger from Menter. 63 The court held that the injunction could
issue without a showing by plaintiff of irreparable injury, since it could
be presumed that, because of the nature of the employer's business, pa-
tients would follow the terminated doctor as a matter of course. 64 Thus,
where the nature of the employment is such that the employee acquires a
personal hold upon the employer's customers, the court uses a sale of
business presumption of irreparable harm and will grant relief without a
showing of actual or potential irreparable harm. 65 This presumption has
been applied to other professions such as accountants, 66 ophthalmolo-
gists, 67 and veterinarians. 68
59. Id at 411, 180 N.W. at 555; see also Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281
Minn. 13, 160 N.W.2d 566 (1968). In Eutectic, the court stated: "Restrictive covenants
that serve primarily to prevent an employee from working for others or for himself in the
same competitive field so as to discourage him from terminating his employment consti-
tute a form of industrial peonage without redeeming virtue in the American enterprise
system." Id. at 20, 160 N.W.2d at 571.
60. See, e.g., Andrews v. Cosgriff, 175 Minn. 431, 221 N.W. 642 (1928); Granger v.
Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 199 N.W. 10 (1924); infra note 73, and accompanying text.
61. 159 Minn. 296, 199 N.W. 10 (1924).
62. Id at 297-98, 199 N.W. at 11.
63. Id at 302-03, 199 N.W. at 13.
64. See id. at 303, 199 N.W. at 13; see also infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
65. See Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 303, 199 N.W. 10, 13; cf Lessner Dental
Laboratories, Inc. v. Kidney, 16 Ariz. App. 159, 162, 492 P.2d 39, 42 (1971) (the court
found it "difficult to believe" that defendant dental technician could draw customers from
plaintiff).
66. See, e.g., Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463 (Del. Ch. 1977). See gener-
ally Note, Covenant Not to Compete Between Professtonals-Severance and Enforcement of Ony that
Portion of Covenant Which is Reasonable in Scope, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 430 (1971). But cf
Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 348 A.2d 208 (1975) (per curiam) (covenant not to
compete by lawyer void against public policy and Disciplinary Rule 2-108(a) of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility).
67. See Gibson v. Angros, 30 Colo. App. 95, 491 P.2d 87 (1971).
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III. ELEMENTS OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Historically, in order to be judicially enforceable restrictive covenants
had to express three limitations:69 geographic, 70 temporal, 7 1 and compo-
sitional. 72 The rule in Minnesota, and in many other jurisdictions, has
been that the absence or unreasonableness of any of these elements
makes the covenant unenforceable as a restraint of trade. 73 Recent Min-
nesota cases have called into question whether this rule is still followed. 74
Although each of the elements can be analyzed separately, courts look at
the impact of all three limitations as a whole. There is some overlapping,
therefore, in the analysis of each limitation.
A. The Geographic Limi'talton
Geographic limitations have been expressed as restraining competition
within a particular city,75 state,76 groups of political entities, 7 7 or a ra-
dius around the employer's business.78 Restrictive covenants that do not
contain a geographic limitation usually fall into the prohibited category
of a general restraint of trade, and are not enforceable. 79 Some jurisdic-
68. See Moore v. Dover Veterinary Hosp., Inc., 116 N.H. 680, 367 A.2d 1044 (1976).
69. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 515 comment c (1932).
70. See infa notes 75-112 and accompanying text.
71. Set tznfa notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
73. The rule in these jurisdictions is explained by Professor Williston as: "[These
courts] refuse to alter the express terms of the covenant by interpretation and will strike
down the entire restraint rather than 'rewrite the contract for the parties.' " 14 S. WILLIS-
TON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1638 (3d ed. 1972).
A court might not enforce a restrictive covenant unless the restraint is set out clearly.
"If such competition is to be restrained upon termination of employment, the employer
should be held to a strict requirement that it express the same in unambiguous language."
Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Bode, 247 Minn. 458, 468, 77 N.W.2d 533, 539 (1956);
accord Puritan/Churchill Chem. Co. v. Eubank, 245 Ga. 334, 265 S.E.2d 16 (1980); see also
Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968) (restrictions to be
valid must be reasonable, not impose undue hardship, and be no wider than necessary to
afford required protection).
74. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979) (tem-
poral limitation extended by court); Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977) (tem-
poral and geographic limitations added by court).
75. See Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 180 N.W. 553 (1920) (City of
Minneapolis).
76. See Thermorama, Inc. v. Buckwold, 267 Minn. 551, 125 N.W.2d 844 (1964).
77. See Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980);
Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968). See generally Note,
Restraints on Trade- Covenants in Employment Contracts not to Compete within the Entire United
States, 49 N.C.L. REv. 393 (1971).
78. See Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 160 N.W.2d 566 (1968);
Marso v. Mankato Clinic, Ltd., 278 Minn. 104, 153 N.W.2d 281 (1967); Bennett v. Storz
Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 134 N.W.2d 892 (1965); Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn.
296, 199 N.W. 10 (1924).
79. National Benefit Co., 45 Minn. 272, 47 N.W. 806 (1891).
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tions will supply the geographic limitation if the covenant is otherwise
reasonable. 80 Critics argue that to supply a missing geographic limita-
tion abrogates the general rule that restrictive covenants, as restraints of
trade, must be strictly construed. For the courts to supply this element
invades the right of the parties to contract. 8 1
In the typical case, a court must decide whether a restrictive covenant
that contains a geographic limitation, is enforceable when the geo-
graphic area is so broad that it is unreasonable. 8 2 In jurisdictions that
follow a strict construction approach, the entire covenant is declared
void. 83 Some jurisdictions have rejected this approach as too harsh,84
and instead, have developed two theories for modifying overly broad ge-
ographic limitations: the traditional blue pencil doctrine, and the Mas-
sachusetts rule, as used in Minnesota.
1. The Blue Pencil Doctrine
The blue pencil doctrine is an equitable device by which a court elimi-
nates any offending provision by striking a distinct portion of the restric-
tion.8 5 For example, consider an employer seeking to enforce an
otherwise valid restrictive covenant encompassing the states of Minne-
sota and Wisconsin. If the employee's sales territory includes only Min-
nesota, the blue pencil doctrine would allow the court to enforce the
covenant to prevent competition in Minnesota but not in Wisconsin.
This example illustrates the requirements necessary for application of the
doctrine. The covenant must contain distinct and severable areas.
86 If
the restriction is a 300-mile radius around the City of Minneapolis, the
doctrine would not apply since the only thing that could be penciled out
80. See, e.g., Hill v. Central West Public Serv. Co., 37 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1930); John
Roane, Inc. v. Tweed, 33 Del. Ch. 4, 89 A.2d 548 (1952); McQuown v. Lakeland Window
Cleaning Co., 136 So. 2d 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas,
291 Mass. 403, 196 N.E. 856 (1935); Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly, 248 Miss. 34, 157
So. 2d 133 (1963); Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 264 A.2d 53 (1970); Igoe v.
Atlas Ready Mix, Inc., 134 N.W.2d 511 (N.D. 1965); Ramey v. Combined Am. Ins. Co.,
359 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Wood v. May, 73 Wash. 2d 307, 438 P.2d 587
(1968); Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955).
81. See Boldt Mach. & Tools, Inc. v. Wallace, 469 Pa. 504, 519-21, 366 A.2d 902, 910-
11 (1976) (Manderino, J. dissenting) ("It is not a difficult task for an employer to write a
legal restrictive covenant into the employment contract. Employers have no incentive to
do so, of course, so long as this court says to such employers: 'Write any covenant you
wish-if it is illegal we'll act as your counsel and rewrite it.' "); Blake, supra note 1, at 682-
83.
82. See Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980).
83. See, e.g., Timenterial, Inc. v. Dagata, 29 Conn. Supp. 180, 277 A.2d 512 (1971).
84. See infa notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
85. Timenterial, Inc. v. Dagata, 29 Conn. Supp. 180, 184, 277 A.2d 512, 514 (1971).
86. See id But see Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 131 n.1
(Minn. 1980) (court declares any reasonable modification by the trial court permitted by
the blue pencil doctrine).
1983]
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would be the "300-mile radius" language.8 7 The court must be able to
erase one or more parts of the area, leaving an area in which the cove-
nant's application is reasonable. 88 The court will not add language to
the contract to make the geographic limitations sufficiently narrow.
The rationale underlying the blue pencil doctrine is that a court is
"merely enforcing the legal parts of a divisible contract."89 Advocates of
a strict construction approach have found this doctrine to be oppressive
to employees for several reasons. First, there is an obvious in terrorem ef-
fect visited upon both the employee and prospective employers if the
employee is contractually bound not to compete with his ex-employer,
even when the restrictive covenant would not be judicially enforceable. 90
Second, "employers can fashion truly ominous covenants with confi-
dence that they will be pared down and enforced when the facts of a
particular case are not unreasonable."91 One critic has characterized
this situation as smacking of "having one's employee's cake, and eating it
too." 9 2
2. The Minnesota Approach
Minnesota subscribes to the most liberal approach to modifying overly
broad geographic limitations.93 Under this approach, the court may
modify an overbroad geographic limitation, whether or not the limita-
tion is severable.94 Until recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court ap-
87. See Timenterial, Inc. v. Dagata, 29 Conn. Supp. 180, 277 A.2d 512 (1971).
88. See id at 184, 277 A.2d at 515.
89. Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. 1977). One jurisdiction has per-
mitted blue penciling only in the sale of a business restrictive convenant. See Redmond v.
Royal Ford, Inc., 244 Ga. 711, 261 S.E.2d 585 (1979).
90. Blake, supra note 1, at 682-83. Professor Blake also notes three ways in which a
restrictive convenant may protect the employer even from legitimate competition. First,
the convenant may deter the employee from leaving his job. Second, the employee may
be ordered out of the business entirely, rather than merely kept from competing. Third,
the employer may be able to protect potential customers in the restricted area. See id at
657.
91. Id. at 683.
92. Id
93. This approach, under which the court enforces the restriction to the extent it is
reasonable, is sometimes called the Massachusetts rule, apparently harking back to Dean
v. Emerson, 102 Mass. 480 (1869). See Timenterial, Inc. v. Dagata, 29 Conn. Supp. 180,
185, 277 A.2d 512, 515 (1971); Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1957); Metropoli-
tan Ice Co. v. Duras, 291 Mass. 403, 196 N.E. 856 (1935).
94. See Insurance Center, Inc. v. Taylor, 94 Idaho 896, 499 P.2d 1252 (1972); Ehlers
v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368, 370, modiftd, 190 N.W.2d 413 (Iowa 1971). In
Taylor, the Idaho court rejected the "divisibility concept" of the doctrine and the in toto
void approach, and accepted the more liberal modifying approach. The restrictive cove-
nant at issue, however, contained no geographic, temporal, or scope of activity limitations.
The court held, as a matter of law, that it could not supply the limitations since they were
essential ingredients which would protect the employee.
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plied this approach only in sale of business restrictive covenant cases. 95
The first Minnesota case to address the issue of partial enforcement of
an overbroad, but non-severable, geographic limitation was A/side, Inc. v.
Larson. 96 In Alside, defendant was an experienced salesman of building
and siding materials. His sales territory included Minnesota, South Da-
kota, and Wisconsin. When plaintiff hired defendant to be a warehouse
manager, defendant's new territory included much of the same area. As
a condition of employment, defendant agreed not to compete for two
years after termination in any territory where he had been located or
employed with plaintiff. The defendant quit after working for plaintiff
for nearly six years and immediately began competing. Under the terms
of the restrictive covenant, broad relief could have been requested; plain-
tiff, however, asked the trial court to limit the injunction to a six-county
area around Minneapolis and St. Paul.97 On appeal, the Minnesota
Supreme Court discussed the similarity between Ohio law, which follows
the blue pencil doctrine,98 and Minnesota law. The court held that it
was permissible to pare down the original, overbroad geographic limita-
tion. After A/side, it appeared that Minnesota would follow the blue pen-
cil doctrine.
Three years after Alside, however, in Bess v. Bothman, 99 which involved
a sale of business restrictive covenant,'0 0 the Minnesota Supreme Court
rejected the blue pencil doctrine as being too formalistic. In Bess, de-
fendant sold two tow trucks and leased a parking lot for one year to
plaintiff. The defendant agreed not to compete with plaintiff in the tow-
ing business although no geographic or temporal limitations were men-
tioned. Ordinarily, the lack of these limitations would render the
covenant void as a restraint of trade under the rule of National Benefit Co.
95. See, e.g., Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977).
96. 300 Minn. 285, 220 N.W.2d 274 (1974). Arguably, Minnesota applied the liberal
approach in Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980), even
though in Davies the court termed it "blue pencilling."
97. Alside, Inc. v. Larson, 300 Minn. at 289, 220 N.W.2d at 277. Thus, the injunction
would cover only those areas where defendant had not worked before he was employed by
plaintiff.
98. Id at 293, 220 N.W.2d at 279; see Extine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc., 176 Ohio
St. 403, 200 N.E.2d 297 (1964). The court in A/side cited Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting
Co., 270 Minn. 252, 134 N.W.2d 892 (1965) and Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West,
281 Minn. 13, 160 N.W.2d 566 (1968), as indicative that Minnesota law is similar to that
of Ohio, despite the fact that those cases make no mention of the blue pencil doctrine. See
Alside, at 29, 220 N.W.2d at 280. Further, Bennett and Eutectic dealt with a geographic
limitation expressed as a radius around the employer's business. The blue pencil doctrine
does not apply to this type of a limitation. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. The
view that the blue pencil doctrine is'identical to the Massachusetts rule, however, has
continued in the court's analysis. See Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d
127, 131 (Minn. 1980).
99. 257 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977).
100. Id at 794-95.
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v. Union Hospital Co. 101 Plaintiff sought an injunction to enforce the cove-
nant after defendant violated the covenant by competing within a year
after the sale. Because the necessary elements for application of the blue
pencil doctrine were not present, the restrictive covenant could be en-
forced only if the court supplied reasonable restraints. The trial court
supplied restrictions, limiting the covenant to a small area around the
plaintiff's business for a five-year period.1o 2 On appeal, the supreme
court stated that no previous Minnesota cases had dealt with the partial
enforcement of a covenant which unreasonably restrained trade, appar-
ently rejecting the Alside decision,103 and affirmed the trial court's
modification.
In the sale of business context, the result in Bess seems equitable; there
was no evidence of unequal bargaining power between the parties,104
and the defendant could give no reason for prohibiting the court from
giving the covenant its intended effect. 105
Unfortunately, Bess was applied in Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Da-
vies. 106 In Davies, the plaintiff insurance agency, the stock of which was
solely owned by its president, hired one of the president's sons. Four
months after the employment relationship began, 107 defendant, the pres-
ident's son, signed a restrictive covenant agreement whereby he agreed
not to compete wih the agency for five years within a fifty-mile radius of
Minneapolis, St. Paul, or Duluth upon termination of employment. 108
Over the years, defendant became the agency's specialist in the sale of
probate and court bonds. After conflicts arose between the agency's pres-
ident and defendant, defendant terminated his employment and began
to compete with plaintiff. The court found that the restriction of compe-
tition within a fifty-mile radius around the named cities was unreasona-
101. 45 Minn. 272, 47 N.W. 806 (1891).
102. Bess, 257 N.W.2d at 794.
103. In Alside, the geographic limitation was pared down considerably at the request of
the employer. Id at 289, 220 N.W.2d at 277; see also Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co.,
270 Minn. 525, 134 N.W.2d 892 (1965).
104. See Bess, 257 N.W.2d at 794 n. 1.
105. See id
106. 298 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1980).
107. In Davies, the court found that the mere continuation of employment could con-
stitute the consideration necessary to uphold a restrictive covenant where the agreement
provided the employee with real advantages. 298 N.W.2d at 131. The court determined
that Davies would not have advanced to the high position he obtained if he had not
signed the agreement. Id. This position was followed in Medtronic v. Gibbons, 527 F.
Supp. 1085, 1093 (D. Minn. 1981), afid, 684 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1982). Recent Minnesota
cases have held that adequacy of consideration depends upon the particular facts of each
case and have found that noncompetition agreements entered into after the employee had
begun employment were invalid because they were not supported by independent consid-
eration. See National Recruiters v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); Jostens, Inc.
v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982).
108. 298 N.W.2d at 129.
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ble because the employee did little business outside of Hennepin County.
Although the court purported to apply the blue pencil doctrine, 09 it re-
ally applied the more liberal Massachusetts rule. 11  Even if the court
severed the cities of Duluth and St. Paul from the agreement, enforcing
the covenant within a fifty-mile radius around the city of Minneapolis
would include an area too broad to be reasonable. l I I The supreme court
held, nevertheless, that the defendant could be enjoined from competing
within a fifty-mile radius of Minneapolis. Dav'es clearly rejects the tradi-
tional blue pencil doctrine and substitutes a rule of judicial reconstruc-
tion. Apparently, the court will now write its own geographic limitations
based not on the language the parties used in the contract, but on what
seems reasonable at some later date after a breach has occurred.11
2
B. Temporal Limitations
Most employment contract restrictive covenants state a time period
during which the employee agrees not to compete with his former em-
ployer after termination. 113 This temporal limitation must be reason-
able. 1' 4 If the temporal limitation is too broad, indefinite, or non-
existent, courts follow the same approaches used when the geographic
limitation is unreasonable.' 15 Minnesota has yet to address the issue of
109. See id. at 131.
110. Under the Massachusetts rule, the restrictive covenant is rewritten by the court so
that the reasonable portion is enforceable. See Timenterial, Inc. v. Dagata, 29 Conn.
Supp. 180, 185, 277 A.2d 513, 515 (1971) ("even though the territory is not divisible in the
wording of the contract it will be enforced as to so much of the area included as would
have been a reasonable area for the application of the restrictive covenant.").
111. 298N.W.2dat 131.
112. Seeid n.l.
113. See H. Walker Employment Serv. v. Parkhurst, 300 Minn. 264, 219 N.W.2d 437
(1974) (one year); Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 199 N.W. 10 (1924) (three years);
Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 180 N.W. 553 (1920) (four years). The restraint can
only extend as far as absolutely necessary. See Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270
Minn. 525, 534, 134 N.W.2d 892, 899 (1965); Combined Ins. Co. v. Bode, 247 Minn. 458,
469, 77 N.W.2d 533, 536 (1956) (applying Illinois law).
114. See cases cited supra note 113; see also Hedberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
350 F.2d 924, 932 (8th Cir. 1965) (applying Minnesota law; court found one-year tempo-
ral limitation reasonable under all the circumstances).
115. See generally supra notes 75-116 and accompanying text. There are a variety of
reasons why temporal limitations have been changed. See, e.g., Styles v. Lyon, 87 Conn. 23,
86 A. 564 (1913) (employee permitted to compete after employer went out of business);
McQuown v. Lakeland Window Cleaning Co., 136 So. 2d 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
(five-year restriction reduced to one year according to statute); see also Slade Gorton & Co.
v. O'Neil, 355 Mass. 4, 242 N.E.2d 551 (1968); Schmidl v. Central Laundry & Supply Co.,
13 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
In one case, the parties agreed in the contract that if the time restriction should be
deemed unreasonable, the period would be for a time deemed reasonable. See Credit Bu-
reau Management Co. v. Huie, 254 F. Supp. 547, 549 (E.D. Ark. 1966).
If the limitation is unlimited with respect to time, some courts will impose a reason-
able restraint. See, e.g., Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, 489 S.W.2d
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whether an employment contract restrictive covenant is enforceable
when it contains no temporal limitation. The result in Bess, 116 a sale of
business case, however, indicates that the court is willing to add whatever
time limitation it finds reasonable.'
1 7
Whether a stated time period is reasonable depends upon the nature of
the employee's work' 18 and the time necessary for the employer to train a
new employee and to allow his customers to become accustomed to the
new employee." 19 In Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 120 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court refused to enforce a two-year limitation against an
employee who was basically a salesman and was a technical representa-
tive in name only. The court found that "plaintiff had unreasonably
extracted from defendant a commitment far broader than his actual
functions and status could reasonably require."121 The result in Eutectic
probably would be different under present Minnesota law, in light of
both Bess 122 and Davies. 123 Normally, where trade secrets are in-
volved,124 or where the services are of a "professional" character,125 limi-
tations of up to four years are held to be reasonable.126
C Compositional Limitations
Inevitably, employees will be exposed occasionally to business infor-
1 (1973); Hansen v. Edwards, 83 Nev. 189, 426 P.2d 792 (1967); Lavey v. Edwards, 264
Or. 331, 505 P.2d 342 (1973); Seligman & Latz, Inc. v. Vernillo, 382 Pa. 161, 114 A.2d 672
(1955).
116. 257 N.W.2d 791 (court supplied five-year temporal limitation).
117. In Bess, the covenant not to compete had been found unreasonable by the trial
court. The trial judge modified the covenant to include reasonable terms and then or-
dered its enforcement. The supreme court affirmed this decision, thus adopting the mi-
nority position on temporal limitations. See id
118. See, e.g., Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979)
(defendants were engineers, sales managers, and consultants); Alside, Inc. v. Larson, 300
Minn. 285, 296, 220 N.W.2d 274, 280 (1974) (employee was trained by employer in busi-
ness operations, and had a unique and intimate relationship with customers); Granger v.
Craven, 159 Minn. 196, 199 N.W. 10 (1924) (doctor restrained from competition for three
years). But see Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 19, 160 N.W.2d 566,
570 (1968) (court refused to enforce two-year restriction against ordinary salesman-em-
ployer had unreasonably extracted a commitment far broader than employee's actual
functions and status could reasonably require).
119. See Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 19, 160 N.W.2d 566,
571 (1968); Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 410-11, 180 N.W. 553, 555 (1920).
120. 281 Minn. 13, 160 N.W.2d 566 (1968).
121. Id at 19, 160 N.W.2d at 570.
122. 257 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977).
123. 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980) (court willing to pare down unreasonable
limitations).
124. Set, e.g., Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979).
125. See supra notes 60-78 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Gibson v. Angros, 30 Colo. App. 95, 491 P.2d 87 (1971) (ophthalmologist
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mation which might adversely affect the employer's competitive advan-
tage if known to competing concerns.127 Skills learned by an employee
as a result of employment, generally are not protectable by restrictive
covenant and the employee is free to take with him any skills learned on
the job.128 Nevertheless, trade secrets, 129 goodwill,13 0 customer lists, 13 ,
and other types of confidential information are commonly the subjects of
restrictive covenants and can be protected under certain circumstances
even in jurisdictions that prohibit restrictive covenants by statute.1
3 2
The phrase "trade secrets" has generated a plethora of cases constru-
ing its meaning.133 The Minnesota court has accepted the Restatement
of Torts definition of a trade secret. A trade secret is:
Any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula or a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating
or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a
list of customers.
134
Although this definition might seem to subsume all confidential informa-
tion under the heading of trade secrets, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has concluded that trade secrets are different.
In Cheme Industries, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, Inc., 135 the court synthe-
127. See Blake, supra note 1, at 627.
128. See Jim. W. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298 N.W.2d 455 (Minn. 1980);accord
Lessner Dental Laboratory, Inc. v. Kidney, 16 Ariz. App. 159, 492 P.2d 39 (1971). See
generally C. KAUFMAN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1391B (Supp. 1984). The owner of the
real estate firm should not be able to enjoin competition by an ex-salesman merely be-
cause the employee was incoherent and inarticulate when first hired and "since developed
a crackerjack high-pressure technique that could sell an outhouse to a movie star." Id
129. See Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 218 Minn. 13, 160 N.W.2d 566 (1968);
Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 180 N.W. 553 (1920).
130. See Alside, Inc. v. Larson, 300 Minn. 285, 220 N.W.2d 274 (1974). In order to
have goodwill for purposes of enforcing a restrictive covenant, the employer must establish
that his business involves repeat customers. See also National Hearing Aid Center, Inc. v.
Avers, 2 Mass. App. 285, 311 N.E.2d 572, 577-78 (1974) (hearing aid sales do not usually
involve repeat sales, so restrictive covenant held unreasonable); C. KAUFMAN, supra note
128, § 1391B.
131. See, e.g., Hedberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1965)
(applying Minnesota law); Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81
(Minn. 1979).
132. See, e.g., Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134,
140 n.4 (9th Cir. 1965); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dempster, 174 Cal. App. 2d
418, 425-26, 344 P.2d 821, 825-26 (1959).
133. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983);
Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81, 89-90 (Minn. 1979). See gener-
ally MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08 (1982) (Uniform Trade Secrets Act); A. TURNER, THE
LAW OF TRADE SECRETS (1962).
134. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939), cited with approval in Cherne
Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81, 89-90 (Minn. 1979).
135. 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979).
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sized definitions of trade secrets and confidential information and set
forth a four-prong test to determine whether matters recited in a restric-
tive covenant were protectable. 136 First, is the information generally
known or easily ascertainable? The court found that the information
taken by defendants from plaintiff was not easily ascertainable, although
it was provided in part by state and federal agencies, since plaintiff's
information was more detailed. 137 Second, does the information provide
a demonstrable competitive advantage? The court found that this test
was met because defendants must have considered the information valu-
able or they would not have bothered to take it.138 Third, was it gath-
ered at the expense of the employer? Plaintiff spent several years
developing the information and the business actually lost money while
the information was being developed. The court thus found this require-
ment to have been met. Fourth, is the information such that the em-
ployer intended to keep it confidential? The court found that all of the
tests were met and the information was therefore protectable under the
restrictive covenant. 139 The four-prong test does not offer any new in-
sights regarding whether given information is protectable, nor probably
should it. No simple analysis or test is likely to be generally accepted as
long as courts continue to decide each case on its particular facts, balanc-
ing together temporal, geographic, and compositional limitations.
IV. REMEDIES
The remedy most frequently sought by employers for breach of a re-
strictive covenant is an injunction restraining the terminated employee
from competing, disclosing, or using confidential information. 140 Other
forms of possible relief include an accounting for profits,14 1 and dam-
ages. 142 Injunctive relief is, however, almost always sought.143 The nor-
136. Id at 90. The Minnesota court has applied the four-prong test in two recent
cases. See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983); see
Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982).
137. 278 N.W.2d at 90; f Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 409, 180 N.W. 553,
554 (1920) (information found not to be trade secrets where widely known throughout the
industry). Although a restrictive covenant is not enforceable, an employer may still re-
cover confidential information taken by a former employee. See Combined Ins. Co. of
America v. Bode, 247 Minn. 458, 77 N.W.2d 533 (1956) (applying Illinois law).
138. Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 90.
139. Id at 91.
140. This is considered the only effective remedy. See 14 S. WILLISTON, supra note 73,
§ 1636 at 103. One unsuccessful defense against an employer's action is the claim that an
injunction is akin to an action for specific performance. Under the so-called "negative
doctrine of mutuality" the employee argues that because he does not have the benefit of
enforcing the contract by injunction, neither should the employer. See Peterson v. John-
son Nut Co., 204 Minn. 300, 283 N.W. 561 (1939).
141. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81, 94-95 (Minn. 1979);
Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co., 209 Minn. 470, 477, 297 N.W. 178, 182 (1941).
142. Both liquidated damages, see Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 180 N.W. 553
[Vol. 9
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mal requirements of injunctive relief apply in restrictive covenant cases:
the employer must have no adequate remedy at law,144 show actual or
threatened irreparable injury, 45 and show the existence of a valid re-
strictive covenant. 146 The discretion to grant or deny the relief rests
solely with the trial court, whose decision is rarely disturbed on
appeal. 147
In Minnesota, the approach in establishing the basis for injunctive re-
lief is set forth in Menter Co. v. Brock. 148 In Men/er, defendant agreed not
to compete with his employer in the city of Minneapolis for four years
after termination of employment. In denying injunctive relief, the court
held that the employer failed to meet its burden of proof because no
irreparable injury was shown. The court stated that the employer must
show that the employee misappropriated either the business' goodwill'
49
(1920), and punitive damages, see Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d
81, 95-97 (Minn. 1979), have been sought. Other remedies which have been sought are
replevin, see Hedberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1965); and
an injunction seeking to prevent an employee from representing that he is working for the
employer. See Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Bode, 247 Minn. 458, 462, 77 N.W.2d
533, 535 (1956). If specified in the contract, the employee may forfeit his contribution to
the employee's profit sharing plan account. See Courington v. Birmington Trust Nat'l
Bank, 347 So. 2d 377 (Ala. 1977). Further, an employee may bring an action for tortious
interfence with contract. See Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 134
N.W.2d 892 (1965).
143. The popularity of injunctive relief is not surprising, because it is the only effective
way an employer can prevent disclosure or use of confidential information or use of good-
will by a terminated employee. See Thermorama, Inc. v. Buckwold, 267 Minn. 551, 552,
125 N.W.2d 844, 845 (1964) ("there is inherent in a situation of this kind damage which is
not susceptible of precise proof.").
144. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81, 92 (Minn. 1979).
145. See Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 409, 180 N.W. 553, 554 (1920). Compare
Holliston v. Ernston, 124 Minn. 49, 52, 144 N.W. 415, 416 (1913) (sale of business) ("in-
junctions are freely granted almost as a matter of course.") with Menter Co. v. Brock, 147
Minn. 407, 180 N.W. 553 (1920) (employment contract; injury must be shown beyond the
mere fact that the employee left and now is competing). In Thermorama, Inc. v.
Buckwold, 267 Minn. 551, 125 N.W.2d 844 (1964), irreparable harm was inferred from the
breach of an employment contract restrictive convenant.
146. This issue is frequently subject to a defense of lack of consideration. The court
looks at several factors to determine whether the contract is supported by consideration.
Among these are whether there was an increase in wages after signing, whether the em-
ployment is at will or for a term, and whether the employee receives additional benefits.
See Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1983); National Recruiters,
Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies,
298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980).
147. See Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 412, 180 N.W. 553, 555 (1920) ("Injunc-
tion will not be granted to enforce the provisions of a contract unless the court is satisfied
that the enforcement will be just and equitable and will not work hardship or
oppression.").
148. Id
149. Id at 409, 180 N.W. at 554.
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or trade secrets.' 50 Unlike sale of business restrictive convenants, the
courts do not presume irreparable injury when a restrictive employment
covenant is breached.151 Yet, where the employer has met his burden of
proof, the court has tailored relief in ways which, at first glance, seem to
go beyond the terms of the contract.
1 52
In Cherne, 153 the general rule that "injunctive relief based on a contract
must be coextensive with the terms of the contract"' 54 was disregarded,
giving employers a significant advantage over employees in the enforce-
ment of restrictive covenants. Plaintiff sought to enjoin several former
employees from competing. Under the terms of the former employees'
employment contracts, they agreed not to compete for two years after
termination. The two-year period had elapsed, however, between the
time the employees terminated and the time of trial. The court disre-
garded the "coextensive relief" rule and looked beyond the four corners
of the restrictive covenants to give effect to what it considered the intent
of the parties at the time they entered into the contracts. 55 The court
analyzed the relief sought not in terms of the written covenants not to
compete, but rather in terms of preventing defendants from breaching
common law duties not to use or disclose confidential information.156
Since enforcement of the written covenants was sought after the contrac-
tual temporal limitation had already expired, strict construction of the
restrictive covenants would have required denial of injunctive relief1
5 7
150. Id," see supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text; see also Menter Co. v. Brock, 147
Minn. 407, 180 N.W. 553 (1920). In denying relief to the employer, the court in Menter
stated:
[C]ourts are and should be cautious in complying with the request of an em-
ployer to enjoin a former servant who has violated a covenant of this sort from
earning a livelihood. It may well be surmised that such a covenant finds its way
into an employment contract not so much to protect the business as to needlessly
fetter the employee, and prevent him from seeking to better his condition by
securing employment with competing concerns.
Id at 411, 180 N.W. at 555; cf. Thermorama, Inc. v. Buckwold, 267 Minn. 551, 125
N.W.2d 844 (1964). Compare Holliston v. Ernston, 124 Minn. 49, 52, 144 N.W. 415, 416
(1913) (injunctions freely granted in sale of business restrictive convenant cases) with Men-
ter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 180 N.W. 553 (1920) (in employment contract restrictive
covenant case, injury must be shown beyond the mere fact that employee left and is now
competing).
152. See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
153. 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979).
154. Id at 93.
155. Id; accord American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Rodriguez, 480 F.2d 223
(lst Cir. 1973); Premier Indus. Corp. v. Texas Indus. Fastener Co., 450 F.2d 444 (5th Cir.
1971). Contra, Boldt Mach. & Tools, Inc. v. Wallace, 469 Pa. 504, 515 n.8, 366 A.2d 902,
908 n.8 (1976).
156. See Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 94.
157. See Hedberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 924, 931 (8th Cir. 1965)
("these agreements are to be strictly construed and the restraint imposed no further than
the language of the contract absolutely requires"). Further, restrictive covenants are to be
[Vol. 9
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To prevent unjust enrichment, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's decision to grant an injunction for two years from
the date of the judgment. The trial court's focus upon enforcing com-
mon law duties not to disclose confidential information was, in effect, a
rewriting of the contract by the court.
In defense of the court's decision, it was the intention of the employer
when entering into the contracts that it be protected from competition
by defendant-employees for two years after termination. As a practical
matter, where, as in Cherne, employees conspire to compete while still
employed, the employer will not receive the benefit of the full contrac-
tual temporal limitation, because an action to enforce the covenant
against competing employees might not be commenced or discovered un-
til some or all of the temporal period has expired. Where the employee
competes without detection for a long period of time, an application of
the rule in Cherne will give effect to the parties' original intention, al-
though, under some circumstances, as where the confidential information
has been disclosed, even this extended relief will not adequately redress
the employer's injury.158
V. CONCLUSION
Minnesota cases on enforcement of restrictive covenants demonstrate
the court's willingness to modify otherwise unreasonable restraints. The
impact of the latest decisions cannot be determined precisely, since each
case is decided on its own particular facts. The trend is, however, away
from the traditional strict construction approach. As the determination
of validity in the employment contract setting steadily approaches the
analysis used in interpreting and enforcing sale of business restrictive
covenants, the contract placed before a new employee, who has little bar-
gaining power over its contents, becomes more and more a contract of
adhesion. With the availability of judicial modification, an increased
willingness on the part of employers to litigate unreasonable covenants is
expected.
construed against the drafter. See Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Bode, 247 Minn. 458,
464, 77 N.W.2d 533, 536 (1956).
158. See Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 160 N.W.2d 566 (1968).
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